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INTRODUCTION
The massive financial disaster of 2008 and the international
credit catastrophe that subsequently developed was a “historic eco-
nomic crisis” that led to a near collapse of the U.S. and global eco-
nomic systems.1  In its aftermath, widespread demands for regulatory
reform reverberated through the financial world.  In the United
States, authorities responded with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
† B.A., University of California, San Diego, 2010; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2013; Edi-
tor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 98.  First and foremost, I am forever indebted to my family
and friends for their everlasting love and encouragement.  I am also grateful to Gary Bar-
nett and Gregory Scopino for their invaluable insights and helpful suggestions, and to
Allison Fumai for her inspiration.  Special thanks to the members of the Cornell Law Review
for their dedication and hard work, especially Joshua Wesneski, Zachary Glantz, Conor
McCormick, Minsuk Han, Kelsey Baldwin, and Cristina Laramee, and to Jeffrey Denn-
hardt.  Lastly, I would like to thank Milson Yu for his tireless patience and unwavering
support.
1 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Reg-
ulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-regulatory-reform.
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and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act or Dodd-Frank),
which spanned an impressive 2,319 pages and provided sea changes
unprecedented in scope since the Great Depression.2  Within this
sprawling legislation is the oft-cited Volcker Rule, which, in a nutshell,
bans proprietary trading by banks whose deposits are federally insured
by the Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation and restricts their
relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds.3  Yet among
all of this discussion about market integrity and the need to protect
the American investor, the public eye has overlooked a business entity
operating in the derivatives markets that represents more than $600
billion in net assets in the U.S. economy: commodity pools.4  Moreo-
ver, much of the scope of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Volcker Rule
hinges on the definitions of “commodity pool” and “commodity pool
operator” (CPO).  Given this fact, it is perhaps surprising that com-
modity pools have garnered little public attention and remain in rela-
tive obscurity when compared to other financial instruments.
In their broadest sense, commodity pools are popular investment
entities that collect funds from participants to then trade in commodi-
ties, other commodity pools, and commodity derivatives.5  A derivative
is a financial contract whose value is determined by the underlying
asset;6 therefore, a commodity derivative is a financial contract whose
value is derived by the underlying commodity, such as wheat, oil, or
other products.7  Commodity pools are attractive to investors because
they enable investors to gain access to investment opportunities while
simultaneously allowing these investors to diversify their portfolios to
2 See Recent Legislation, Corporate Law—Securities Regulation—Congress Expands Incen-
tives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1829
(2011) (explaining that Dodd-Frank “reaches almost ‘every corner’ of the financial indus-
try, . . . governing everything from debit cards to hedge funds to mortgages” (footnotes
omitted)).
3 See Colleen Murray, In Case You Missed It: Paul Volcker Talks Dodd-Frank, Volcker Rule
on Charlie Rose, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/
connect/blog/Pages/In-Case-You-Missed-It-Paul-Volcker-Talks-Dodd-Frank-Volcker-Rule-
on-Charlie-Rose.aspx; John Carreyrou, Goldman in Push on Volcker Limits, WALL ST. J., Oct.
10, 2012, at C1.
4 See Sharon Brown-Hruska, Acting Chariman, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Securities Industry Association Hedge Funds Conference
(Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches04/opabrown-hruska-22.
htm.  As of November 30, 2004, there were approximately 3,500 commodity pools run by
some of the largest institutions in the financial industry. Id.
5 See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity Exchange
Act: A Call for Alternatives, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1990) (explaining the progression of
the regulation of futures contracts); Commodity Pool Operator (CPO), NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N,
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfa-registration/cpo/index.HTML (last visited Sept. 19,
2013).
6 Derivatives, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-
markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/index-derivatives.html (last visited Sept.
19, 2013).
7 See MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 14.01[A] (4th ed. 2012).
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prevent risk.8  CPOs, on the other hand, are organizations or individu-
als that manage commodity pools.  CPOs must register with the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or the Commission), the
administrative agency that generally oversees the derivatives and com-
modities markets.9  The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) regulates,
among other things, commodity futures trading.10
In amending the CEA, the Dodd-Frank Act became the first piece
of legislation to add a definition of the term “commodity pool.”11
This is a profound change given that commodity pools historically
have been in the background in the formal rulemaking and legisla-
tion of financial instruments.  Dodd-Frank reversed course and added
a plethora of new mandates and oversight techniques for the CFTC.
For example, Dodd-Frank expanded the definition of commodity
pools to include investment vehicles that not only trade in futures but
also in swaps—bilateral contracts in which parties agree to exchange
cash flows at some predetermined schedule.12  In addition,
Dodd-Frank required the CFTC to narrow the circumstances that
would exempt a CPO from registration.13
Dodd-Frank’s addition of a definition of commodity pools
presents two major concerns for the financial industry.  First, because
“commodity pool” is now a defined term, the categorization of a busi-
ness entity as a commodity pool becomes significant because it can
subject the entity to certain clearing requirements.14  Clearing re-
quirements mandate an institution or person to act as a central
counterparty to the original participants in a contract to mitigate the
8 See MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, COMMODITY TRADING ADVISOR & COMMODITY POOL OPER-
ATOR 101, at 3 (2012), available at https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/05/MFA_CTA_CPO101_05-2012.pdf.
9 See Commodity Pool Operator (CPO), supra note 5. R
10 Commodity Exchange Act, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://
www.cftc.gov/lawregulation/commodityexchangeact/index.htm (last visited Sept. 19,
2013).
11 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 721, 124 Stat. 1376, 1659 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(10)
(2012)).
12 ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FOR-
WARDS, FUTURES, SWAPS AND OPTIONS 2 (2d ed. 2010).  A common type of swap is the credit
default swap, in which one party pays premiums to another party to insure itself in the
event a security defaults on payment. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in
Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 682–83 (2012).
13 For an explanation of the exemptions, see Commodity Pool Operator & Commodity
Trading Advisor Exemptions and Exclusions, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/Intermediaries/CPOs/cpoctaexemptionsexclu
sions (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
14 Michael Bopp & Jeffrey L. Steiner, Dodd-Frank Implementation: Impact of Title VII and
Related CFTC and SEC Regulations on Derivatives End-Users, GIBSON DUNN 1 (May 16, 2012),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/DoddFrank-ImpactofTitleVII-
RelatedCFTC-SECRegulations-DerivativesEndUsers.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN104.txt unknown Seq: 4  1-NOV-13 10:27
204 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:201
risk of nonperformance.15  Because the definition of commodity pools
is subsumed under categories of entities that are subject to clearing
requirements, it is important to interpret the definition of commodity
pools in a sufficiently narrow fashion.  This avoids the unintended
consequence of encompassing business entities that fall under the
technical definition of a commodity pool but functionally are not the
types of collective-investment vehicles that the regulators envisioned.
Secondly, the Dodd-Frank Act’s expansion of the definition of a com-
modity pool and the CFTC’s narrowing of the exemptions for CPOs
have the effect of increasing regulatory burdens.  Imposing these reg-
ulatory burdens may effectively prevent some investors from hedging
or managing their risks, thereby undermining the CEA’s dual purpose
of market integrity and investor protection.16
These considerations bring to light the importance of the defini-
tions of a commodity pool and a CPO.  How these terms are defined
ultimately direct the scope of some of the major provisions of the
Volcker Rule and the Dodd-Frank Act.  In functional terms, the defini-
tions will also provide participants with sufficient information to allow
them to effectively manage their investment risk, which ultimately pro-
motes a more efficient market.  This Note will demonstrate that the
CFTC has traditionally declined to adopt a bright-line rule for deter-
mining whether a business entity is a commodity pool and whether an
institution or a person is a CPO.  This Note will argue that the current
ad hoc approach should be further refined and that the CFTC should
provide more concrete definitions by using the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (1940 Act) and its treatment of investment companies as a
model.
Part I provides the factual background regarding relevant aspects
of a commodity pool and a CPO and the responsibilities that attach to
these designations.  Part II of this Note will detail the current regula-
tory regime surrounding commodity pool operators.  It will discuss
prominent interpretative letters that the CFTC has issued and high-
light discrepancies in the current approach.  Part II will also examine
why, in light of the new legislation, a more concrete standard is neces-
sary.  Part III outlines the relevant legislative history.  In addition, Part
III argues that the Investment Company Act of 1940’s treatment of
investment companies should serve as a standard for determining who
is a commodity pool operator under the Commodity Exchange Act.
15 Ed Nosal & Robert Steigerwald, What Is Clearing and Why Is It Important?, FED. RE-
SERVE BANK CHI. (Sept. 2010), http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/
chicago_fed_letter/2010/september_278.cfm.
16 The underlying rationale for regulation includes managing externalities such as
liquidity risks, facilitating the transfer of information in an efficient marketplace, and fos-
tering healthy competition. See Yesha Yadav, Looking for the Silver Lining: Regulatory Reform
After the “Credit Crunch,” 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 314, 319 (2010).
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I
LOGISTICS: THE FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF COMMODITY POOLS
AND COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS
Before engaging in a discussion of the standard by which to evalu-
ate whether a person’s activities subject him or her to the CFTC’s
rules governing commodity pool operators, an understanding of the
functions of commodity pools and CPOs is necessary.
A. Commodity Pools
Commodity pools are funds that are operated and managed by
CPOs and traded by commodity trading advisors (CTAs).17  The CFTC
defines a commodity pool as “[a]n investment trust, syndicate, or simi-
lar form of enterprise operated for the purpose of trading commodity
futures or option contracts.”18  In practical terms, a commodity pool is
an investment vehicle in which assets of multiple individuals are col-
lected, or “pooled” together, to engage in the business of investing in
commodity contracts.19  The commodity pool raises capital by selling
interests in the commodity pool and using the capital to make its in-
vestments.20  The individuals share on a pro rata basis the profits and
losses of the commodity pool.21  Commodity pools can be structured
as joint trading accounts or general partnerships.22  However, limited
partnerships, limited liability companies or corporations, and trusts
are the more conventional structures of commodity pools, as these
forms allow the participants to limit their liability.23  Regardless of the
structure, commodity pools often contain a substantial amount of re-
17 See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(11) (2012) (defining CPOs); id. § 1a(12) (defining commodity
trading advisors).  A commodity trading advisor is an organization or a person who advises
others in buying or selling financial instruments such as futures contracts or swaps in ex-
change for compensation. See Commodity Pool Operator (CPO), supra note 5.  For more infor- R
mation about CTAs and their registration requirements and exemptions, see 1 PHILIP
MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 238–50 (2004).
18 CFTC Glossary, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.
gov/consumerprotection/educationcenter/cftcglossary/glossary_co (last visited Sept. 19,
2013); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1a(10) (defining “commodity pool”); 17 C.F.R. § 4.10(d)(1)
(2012) (defining “pool”).  This also includes any commodity for future delivery, swap, or
commodity option. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(10).
19 See CFTC Glossary, supra note 18. R
20 13 JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER
CLAIMS § 17A:1, at 17A-1 (2009) [hereinafter COMMODITIES TREATISE].
21 See CFTC Glossary, supra note 18. R
22 2 EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 18.13[1], at 18-95 (10th ed. 2012).
23 See id.  The personal liability of a participant is limited to the amount of their invest-
ment in the pool. See id.  However, although the investors enjoy limited liability, the com-
modity pool must have a general partner if they are structured as a limited partnership. See
James G. Smith, A Securities Law Primer for Commodity Pool Operators, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 281, 287. A CPO is typically the general partner of the commodity pool and is person-
ally liable for its debts. Id.  For this reason, a CPO is often a business entity structured as a
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sources and thus can assume diversified risk in investments.24  This
allows the investor a wider range of opportunities than if the investor
had participated in the transactions as an individual.25  It effectively
increases the investing power of each participant.  Moreover, investors
participating in commodity pools do not shoulder the burden of deliv-
ery on futures contracts and are not required to meet margin calls.26
The CFTC has broadly interpreted the definition of a commodity
pool, and the courts have attempted to clarify the definition.27  In de-
termining whether an investment vehicle is a commodity pool, the
CFTC has considered factors such as (i) the rate at which it trades
commodity interests; (ii) the percentage of its assets dedicated to com-
modity interest trading; (iii) the purpose for the trades, whether it be
for speculation or hedging; (iv) the types of investors; and (v) the way
in which it is marketed to investors.28  The CFTC has indicated that
the inquiry necessarily requires a case-by-case evaluation.29  Moreover,
the CFTC has explicitly stated that trading commodity interests does
not need to be the sole or even dominant purpose of a fund for it to
be a commodity pool.30  In some instances, simply having the trading
of commodity interests as “a purpose” is sufficient for the entity to
constitute a commodity pool.31  Courts have elaborated on the CFTC’s
guidelines.32  Courts consider the presence of certain factors, includ-
ing (i) the presence of combined funds from multiple investors, the
solicitation of which is for the purpose of trading in commodity fu-
tures contracts; (ii) participation in losses and profits on a pro rata
basis; (iii) the designation of a CPO to engage in transactions rather
than the participants of the entity; and (iv) the engagement of busi-
ness on behalf of the entire account.33
corporation, since the corporate form shields the general partner from unlimited liability.
See id.
24 See COMMODITIES TREATISE, supra note 20, at 17A-2. R
25 Daniel F. Zimmerman, Note, CFTC Reauthorization in the Wake of Long-Term Capital
Management, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 133–34.
26 See COMMODITIES TREATISE, supra note 20, at 17A-2. R
27 See 2 GREENE ET AL., supra note 22, at 18-94; infra notes 32–33 and accompanying R
text.
28 2 GREENE ET AL., supra note 22, at 18-95. R
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
32 See Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 805 F.2d 880, 883–84 (9th Cir. 1986).
33 Id. at 884. But see American Securitization Forum, CFTC Interpretative Letter No.
12-14, 2012 WL 4863670, at *3 (Oct. 11, 2012) (stating that “although the Lopez factors are
useful, they are not dispositive and the failure of a fund to satisfy one or more of the factors
does not mean that the fund is not a pool”).
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B. Commodity Pool Operators
The CFTC views the CPO and the commodity pools that the CPO
operates as separate legal entities.34  The CFTC does not regulate the
actual commodity pool itself; rather, it regulates the CPO.35  Section
1a(11)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act defines a CPO as:
any person (i) engaged in a business that is of the nature of a com-
modity pool, investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enter-
prise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits, accepts, or receives
from others, funds, securities, or property, either directly or
through capital contributions, the sale of stock or other forms of
securities, or otherwise, for the purpose of trading in commodity
interests, including any—(I) commodity for future delivery, security
futures product, or swap; . . . [or] (ii) who is registered with the
Commission as a commodity pool operator.36
In other words, a CPO is someone who controls the daily operations
of the commodity pool and solicits funds on its behalf.37
The CEA permits the CFTC to exercise discretion in determining
who to include, or exclude, from the definition of CPO outlined in
the CEA at section 1a(11)(B).38  The determination of whether a per-
son is a CPO has significant regulatory consequences because the CEA
and accompanying regulations subject a CPO to registration and re-
porting requirements.39  Absent an exemption,40 the statute requires
that all CPOs register with the National Futures Association (NFA) to
engage in futures business.41  Registration with the NFA entails filing
documents such as a Form 7-R and ensuring that pool participants
receive the financial statements that are to be included in the annual
reports.42  Registrants must file electronically with the NFA as well as
34 Jeffrey S. Rosen, Regulation of Commodity Pool Operators Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 950 (1983).
35 COMMODITIES TREATISE, supra note 20, at 17A-3.  The CEA’s regulation of the opera- R
tor of the investment entity instead of the entity itself differs from regulation under the
Investment Company Act. Id. at 17A-18.
36 CEA § 1a(11)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(11)(A) (2012).
37 Jonathan H. Gatsik, Note, Hedge Funds: The Ultimate Game of Liar’s Poker, 35 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 591, 608 (2001). A CPO is a kind of financial intermediary and plays a role in
matching supply with demand. See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90
B.U. L. REV. 1, 7–16 (2010) (describing “the role of financial intermediaries in allocating
and transferring capital”).  Intermediaries exist to facilitate market efficiency and to lower
transaction costs, as well as assist investors in managing risk. Id. at 8–9.  They are responsi-
ble for not only transmitting information to investors but also providing access to invest-
ment opportunities through their relationships and knowledge. Id.
38 7 U.S.C. § 1a(11)(B).
39 See Commodity Pool Operator (CPO), supra note 5. R
40 See id.; see also Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors: Com-
pliance Obligations, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,328, 17,328–29 (Mar. 26, 2012) (describing amend-
ments to 17 C.F.R. pt. 4 relating to exemption).
41 See Commodity Pool Operator (CPO), supra note 5. R
42 2 GREENE ET AL., supra note 22, § 18.17[1][a], at 18-132. R
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pay both a $200 registration fee and a $750 annual fee to the NFA.43
Moreover, with certain exceptions, a CPO has the additional responsi-
bility of ensuring that each associated person44 of the CPO also regis-
ters with the NFA.45  In addition, CPOs and associated persons are
required to meet certain proficiency standards.46  Principals also need
to file certain documents with the NFA.47  Furthermore, both the
principals and the associated persons must file a Form 8-R, which re-
quires them to detail relevant biographical information such as em-
ployment history.48
C. Disclosure, Reporting, and Recordkeeping Requirements
Aside from compliance with stringent registration requirements,
a CPO also must furnish a two-part disclosure document to each pro-
spective investor of a commodity pool.49  This entails enclosing (1) a
Disclosure Statement and (2) a Statement of Additional Informa-
tion.50  The information contained in the Disclosure Statement is lim-
ited to “information required by the CFTC’s Part 4 Regulations and
any other information that the SEC or state securities administrators
require to be included.”51  This information includes identification of
the CPO, the major CTAs,52 and principals, along with the business
43 Id. at 18-133.  For a template of Form 7-R, see NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, 7-R TEMPLATE
(2013), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-registration/templates-and-forms/
Form7-R-entire.pdf.
44 An associated person is a natural person (as opposed to a corporation) who solicits
investors and funds for a commodity pool or supervises anyone who acts in that capacity.
Id.  They are often described as the “salespersons.” Associated Person (AP), NAT’L FUTURES
ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-registration/ap/index.HTML (last visited Sept.
19, 2013).  For a more detailed explanation of exemptions and registration requirements,
see 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(aa)(3) (2012); Associated Person (AP), supra.
45 2 GREENE ET AL., supra note 22, § 18.17[1][b], at 18-134. R
46 Proficiency Requirements, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-
registration/proficiency-requirements.HTML (last visited Sept. 19, 2013) (listing the profi-
ciency standards, which are demonstrated either by taking an exam or meeting one of the
alternatives listed on the website).
47 For more information on what documents principals need to file, see Principal,
NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-registration/principal/index.
HTML (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
48 2 GREENE ET AL., supra note 22, at 18-135; Commodity Pool Operator (CPO), supra note R
5. R
49 2 GREENE ET AL., supra note 22, § 18.17[2], at 18-136. R
50 NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS: A GUIDE FOR CPOS AND CTAS 21
(2010) [hereinafter DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS GUIDE], available at http://www.nfa.futures.
org/NFA-compliance/publication-library/disclosure-document-guide.pdf.  For more infor-
mation regarding CPO disclosure documents, see Disclosure Documents, NATIONAL FUTURES
ASSOCIATION, http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-compliance/NFA-commodity-pool-
operators/cpo-disclosure-documents.HTML (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
51 DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS GUIDE, supra note 50, at 21. R
52 The NFA defines a major commodity trading advisor as “any CTA that is currently
or will be allocated 10 percent or more of the pool’s assets.” DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS
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background of each individual.53  Moreover, the CPO must detail the
“types of commodity interests and other interests that the pool will
trade, including the approximate percentage of the pool’s assets that
will be used to trade commodity interests,” and other applicable infor-
mation.54  Furthermore, a discussion of principal risk factors must be
included, analyzing issues such as leverage, volatility, and concentra-
tion risk.55  Other disclosures related to performance, proprietary
trading results, conflicts of interest, and liability must also be in-
cluded.56  To ensure delivery, the CPO must obtain written confirma-
tion from the pool participants and prospective investors that they
received the Disclosure Statement.57  The CPO may also submit sup-
plemental information in the Statement of Additional Information,
provided that the information is not misleading and does not violate
applicable regulations or law.58
The CPO must also maintain timely records and adhere to re-
porting requirements pertaining to each individual commodity
pool.59  For example, the CPO must furnish audited financial state-
ments.60  CPOs are also required to “keep certain books and records
in an accurate, current and orderly manner at its main business of-
fice” for five years.61  Specifically, CPOs must maintain records of their
GUIDE, supra note 50, at 27; see also 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12) (2012) (defining “commodity trading R
advisor”).
53 DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS GUIDE, supra note 50, at 25, 27. R
54 Id. at 26.  Applicable information includes categorizing the commodity interests by:
type of commodity or market sector, type of security (debt, equity, pre-
ferred equity), whether traded or listed on a regulated exchange market,
maturity ranges and investment ratings, . . . . [and] the extent to which such
interests are subject to state or federal regulation, regulation by non-United
States jurisdiction or rules of a self-regulatory organization.
Id.
55 Id. at 28.
56 Id. at 10, 17, 32, 35.
57 Id. at 1; see also CFTC Rule 4.23, 17 C.F.R. § 4.23 (2012) (provision for recordkeep-
ing); CFTC Rule 4.22, 17 C.F.R. § 4.22 (2012) (provision for reporting to pool partici-
pants).  An exception to the reporting requirement applies if the CPO is soliciting interest
from only Qualified Eligible Persons or if the commodity trading advisor is directing the
account of one. DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS GUIDE, supra note 50, at 1. R
58 2 GREENE ET AL., supra note 22, at 18-140. R
59 Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs) & Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs), U.S. COM-
MODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/
Intermediaries/CPOs/index.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter CPOs & CTAs
Oversight].  For details on how the structure of funds can affect filing requirements, see
generally THOMAS J. SMITH, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, ANNUAL GUIDANCE
LETTER FOR COMMUNITY POOL OPERATORS 2011 (2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/
industryoversight/intermediaries/guidancecporeports.
60 SMITH, supra note 59, at 4; CPOs & CTAs Oversight, supra note 59.  For information R
regarding timeliness of filing and possible circumstances that warrant an extension, see 17
C.F.R. § 4.22.
61 2 GREENE ET AL., supra note 22, § 18.17[5], at 18-146 to -147. R
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marketing activity, their pools’ transactions, and the financial condi-
tion of their pools.62
II
THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME FOR
CPO DETERMINATION
An understanding of how commodity pools and CPOs fit within
the current financial regulatory structure is crucial.  This is due in
large part to the administrative finding that the activities of CPOs,
along with the associated persons and CTAs of commodity pools, “are
affected with a national public interest.”63  Specifically, the CFTC has
stated that the CPOs affect national public interest by “providing a
means for managing and assuming price risks, discovering prices, or
disseminating pricing information through trading in liquid, fair and
financially secure trading facilities.”64  Therefore, the responsibilities
that the CEA and regulations promulgated thereunder placed on the
CPO are meant to “serve the public interests . . . through a system of
effective self-regulation of . . . market participants and market profes-
sionals under the oversight of the Commission.”65  The purpose of
regulatory requirements is to “deter and prevent price manipulation
or any other disruptions to market integrity[,] . . . the avoidance of
systemic risk[,] . . . [and] to protect all market participants from
fraudulent or other abusive sales practices.”66
Although the requirements that the CFTC imposes on CPOs are
clear and well settled, the determination of who qualifies as a CPO is
more ambiguous.  Since the inception of the CPO as a regulated en-
tity in 1975, the CFTC has pursued an informal system to make the
determination of who qualifies as a CPO.67  Rather than make affirma-
tive, categorical distinctions based on factors that would make a per-
son a CPO, the CFTC has instead adopted a broad definition and
granted exceptions when necessary.68  The Commission utilizes an ad
hoc approach, granting exemptions from CPO status on a case-by-case
basis.69  This method is reflected through the interpretative letters
62 Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 4.23 (recordkeeping requirements).
63 See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
64 Id.; see also id. § 2(b) (stating that “a transaction in respect to any article shall be
considered to be in interstate commerce if such article is part of that current of commerce
usual in the commodity trade”).
65 See id. § 5.
66 See id.; see also id. § 2(b) (stating that transactions involving commodities are consid-
ered to be transactions in interstate commerce).
67 See Rosen, supra note 34, at 961. R
68 See infra Part I.B.
69 See Rosen, supra note 34, at 961 (“The Commission has never used its power to R
exclude persons or entities from the [pool operator] definition [by rule], but it has ex-
cused specific entities from pool operator regulation on an ad hoc basis.”); cf. CFTC Inter-
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that the CFTC issues upon request, and it can produce results that at
first glance are not intuitive.
A. Regulation by Ad Hoc Interpretation
There are a few prominent interpretative letters that are widely
cited.  One of these letters concerns family investment entities.70  The
interpretative letter No. 10-25 involved an investment entity “A,”
which was a limited liability company with two members and was man-
aged by “C”; “C” was an investment professional who also established a
family trust.71  “A” was the only member of “B,” another limited liabil-
ity company.72  “B” would trade commodity futures contracts exclu-
sively for its own account.73  “C” would manage only “A” and “B” but
would not receive compensation for those services.74  The CFTC held
that because of the close family relationships of the persons involved
and the realm of their financial transactions, “A” and “B” were not
pools “within the meaning and intent of [the CPO regulations] and,
consequently, that “C” [was] not a CPO thereof.”75
This result is seemingly inconsistent with the decision that the
CFTC reached in another interpretative letter, No. 75-17, regarding
investment entities that were registered with the SEC as investment
companies.76  The CFTC noted that although the investment entities
did not engage in trading commodity futures, they had solicited funds
from others in the past.77  The CFTC held that mere intent to trade
commodity futures in the future was sufficient to render the invest-
ment entities commodity pools.78  Moreover, the CFTC stated that the
regulations did not contain an exemption for CPOs that operated
pretative Letter No. 00-89, 2000 WL 34514266, at *2 (Sept. 11, 2000) (stating “[w]hether a
particular entity is operated ‘for the purpose’ of trading commodity interests, and thus is a
pool within the scope of Rule 4.10(d), depends on an evaluation of all the facts relevant to the
entity’s operation” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Revisions of Commod-
ity Pool Operator and Commodity Trading Advisor Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,004,
26,006 (May 8, 1981) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 4, 140) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).  This illustrates that the ambiguity is due in part to the broad definition the
Commission gives to a commodity pool. See CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 00-89, supra, at
*2.  In any case, the determination of whether something is a commodity pool or whether
someone is a CPO is often a fact-specific inquiry.






76 CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 75-17, [1975–1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,112 (Nov. 4, 1975).
77 Id.
78 Id.
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commodity pools that presently were not soliciting or trading.79  Thus,
the CFTC asserted that the persons who operated the investment com-
panies were CPOs and therefore subject to the CFTC’s registration
requirements.80  The CFTC determined that “the legislative history of
the [Commodity Exchange] Act [made] clear that Congress intended
the pool operator definition to cover any firm or individual that han-
dles or exercises control over the funds of persons who invest[ed] in com-
modity pools, regardless of whether the firm or individual is also
currently engaged in soliciting, accepting or receiving funds.”81
The CFTC added yet a further wrinkle in a more recent interpre-
tative letter, No. 00-89.82  The CFTC asserted that a limited partner-
ship that engaged in commodity futures transactions in the hog
industry was not a commodity pool for the purposes of the regula-
tions.83  The CFTC reasoned that because the “commodity interest
trading [was] solely for the purpose of hedging its hog production
and related feed costs” and therefore not a commodity pool, the gen-
eral partner did not need to register as a CPO.84  In another interpre-
tative letter, No. 09-44, the CFTC decided that a person who was a
general partner of a commodity pool organized as a limited partner-
ship was not required to register as a CPO when the general partner
delegated its management authority to another registered CPO.85
When one takes into account the interpretative letters just dis-
cussed, one can come to a series of dubious conclusions.  The inter-
pretative letters seem to suggest that an entity that operated an
inactive commodity pool would be required to register86 but could
effectively shirk the registration responsibilities by delegating its tasks
to another person or entity.87  Furthermore, it would seem that enti-
ties could lessen their obligations if they entrusted someone with
whom they had a personal relationship with their investments.88
79 Id.  In explaining that there was an “absence of a ‘present solicitation’ require-
ment,” the CFTC noted that the requirement would lead to a perverse result. Id.  For
example, a registered pool operator could potentially refuse to renew his registration until
the pool actively solicited or engaged in trading. Id.  However, throughout the time the
pool remained dormant, the pool would be without the protection afforded by the registra-
tion requirements imposed on the CPO. Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 00-89, supra note 69, at *3. R
83 Id.  The limited partnership had forty-two participants, the majority of which were
farmers from Iowa. Id. at *1.  The transactions at issue in the interpretative letter occurred
in the hog, corn, and soymeal markets. Id. In this particular instance, ninety-five percent
of the revenue of the limited partnership was derived from the sale of hogs. Id.
84 Id. at *2.
85 CFTC No-Action Letter No. 09-44, 2009 WL 2923476, at *1 (Aug. 21, 2009).
86 See CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 75-17, supra note 76. R
87 CFTC No-Action Letter No. 09-44, supra note 85, at *1. R
88 See CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 10-25, supra note 70, at *1. R
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The interpretative letters discussed above highlight the ad hoc
approach the CFTC has adopted in determining who is a CPO and
subject to registration.89  The interpretative letters also demonstrate
that whether or not someone is a CPO is often a fact-intensive inquiry
that is highly contingent on the individual circumstances of each busi-
ness.90  An ad hoc approach has the advantage of providing the flexi-
bility that a “totality of the circumstances” test requires.91  An
amorphous standard can also benefit investors because it encourages
those that could be potentially liable to err on the side of disclosure.
In this instance, it will encourage potential CPOs to try to determine
whether or not they should register as such.  A somewhat ambiguous
standard also allows investors to bring suit more easily and argue that
someone should have registered as a CPO, and it gives the courts
more flexibility to apply the definition of a commodity pool.  How-
ever, such a standard creates difficulties for people in predicting
whether they have CPO status and obscures the purpose the CPO re-
gistration requirements were intended to effectuate: to provide a
“foundation for eliminating certain undesirable practices by unscru-
pulous operators and advisors who . . . ‘enticed unsuspecting traders
into the markets with, far too often, substantial loss of funds.’”92
B. Inefficiencies of the Status Quo
This ad hoc approach creates an ambiguity that is especially prob-
lematic in light of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Volcker Rule.
Dodd-Frank’s treatment of end-users provides an example of how an
ad hoc approach can actually undermine market efficiency; it can also
provide investors with less protection if the standard is not sufficiently
concrete.  “End-users are a category of market participants that utilize
the . . . market to hedge exposed market risk and minimize volatility
of their overall earnings” and can be either financial or nonfinancial
entities.93  Under Dodd-Frank, end-users are subject to obligations
such as clearing requirements, which require the end-users’ trans-
acted financial instruments to be traded through a central
counterparty.94  However, the CFTC provides an “end-user exception”
to nonfinancial entities that trade derivatives only for hedging pur-
89 See supra notes 70–85 and accompanying text. R
90 See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. R
91 See supra notes 70–85 and accompanying text (demonstrating the CFTC’s ad hoc R
approach to CPO and commodity pool determination, which allows the agency to address
circumstances as they arise).
92 CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 00-89, supra note 69, at *2 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. R
93-975, at 86 (1979)).
93 Carney Simpson, Note, Do End-Users Get the Best of Both Worlds?—Title VII of Dodd-
Frank and the End-User Exception, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1759, 1773–74 (2012).
94 See id. at 1782–83.
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poses and exempts them from the clearing requirement.95  In light of
this exception, the definition of a commodity pool and who operates a
commodity pool is significant.  A commodity pool, as currently de-
fined, falls under the definition of “financial entity” and thus is not
entitled to the end-user exception.96  Therefore, CPOs and the partici-
pants of the commodity pool would have to concern themselves with
the clearing requirements.97  Moreover, persons or entities that apply
for the exemption from registration would, in effect, be claiming that
they are currently commodity pools.  Consequently, these “commodity
pools” would be “financial entities” subject to the requirements
Dodd-Frank imposes on these institutions.
The addition of swaps into the definition of commodity pools fur-
ther muddles the picture.  Due to the recent amendments, securitiza-
tion vehicles that use swaps are now required to consider whether
their entities constitute commodity pools.98  Uncertainty continues to
linger, as the CFTC has not promulgated a de minimis exception or
delineated any rule for determining the threshold involvement of
swaps that would cause a securitization vehicle to become a commod-
ity pool.99  Absent an exemption, characterizing a securitization vehi-
cle as a commodity pool would subject its sponsor to CPO registration
requirements.100  Moreover, labeling a securitization vehicle as a com-
modity pool has implications that are independent of CPO registra-
tion.101  The Volcker Rule restricts banks from certain activities such
as sponsoring a covered fund,102 which may include a commodity
pool.103  Potentially, subsuming commodity pools under the defini-
tion of a covered fund could significantly expand the reach of a “cov-
95 Id. at 1784–85.
96 Bopp & Steiner, supra note 14, at 2. R
97 See id.
98 Is Your Securitization Vehicle a Commodity Pool Because of Its Use of Swaps, and Do You




99 Id. at 2.
100 See id. at 1–2.
101 See id. at 1.
102 The Volcker Rule Proposal: Regulators Propose Restrictions on “Covered Funds,” PRICE-
WATERHOUSECOOPERS 1 (Dec. 2011), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/
regulatory-services/publications/assets/closer-look-volcker-covered-funds.pdf [hereinafter
Volcker Rule Proposal].  A banking entity “sponsors” a fund if it “serves as  general partner,
managing member, trustee or commodity pool advisor or in any manner selects or controls
directly or indirectly a majority of the directors, trustees, or management of a covered
fund.” Id. at 4.  These provisions regarding covered funds are meant to prevent the bank-
ing entity from sidestepping the prohibition of trading as a principal in various financial
instruments. Id. at 2.  The covered fund provisions are meant to further the ban on bank-
ing entities in engaging in proprietary trading. Id. at 2.
103 SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 98, at 11. R
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ered fund” and implicate funds that are only minimally involved in
commodities such as swaps.104  This would effectively prevent the
banking entity from entering into transactions with the securitization
vehicle.105  Those affected are also reluctant to seek guidance or relief
from the CFTC as “an approach to the CFTC [might] not result in
relief being granted or [might] result in unacceptable conditions to
relief.”106  Moreover, the CFTC, “in the course of granting or denying
relief, [might] articulate additional criteria . . . that may be problem-
atic for certain transaction structures.”107  Furthermore, simply re-
questing relief is an implicit acknowledgment that the securitization
vehicle is a commodity pool.108
These instances are representative of undesirable results that
would occur if the definitions of the terms “commodity pool” and
“CPO” are not sufficiently clear.  This is an undesirable result since
the types of investors that will be negatively impacted by these ambigu-
ities are more likely to be the types of investors that Congress did not
intend to regulate.  The institutions and persons that would be more
likely to apply for an exemption from CPO registration are probably
those who operate business entities that technically could fall under
the definition of CPO but who do not function as conventional com-
modity pools due to their more esoteric structures.  These ambiguities
would impose high transactional risks that could impede a market
participant’s ability to manage its own business risk.  It would make it
more difficult for the average market participant in the commodities
and derivatives space to understand the impact of these regulations
on its day-to-day transactions and make compliance with the regula-
tions more difficult.  Oftentimes, these market participants participate
in commodity pools to hedge risk, not to turn a profit on the invest-
ment.  But these ambiguities could potentially negate the risk-mitigat-
ing benefits derived from the investment, which could lead these
market participants to pull out of the market.  Fewer market partici-
pants would lead to a net reduction in the industry, which in turn
would mean less liquidity in the market due to fewer transacting
parties.
104 See Volcker Rule Proposal, supra note 102, at 4. R
105 SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 98, at 11. R
106 Id. at 8.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 11.
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III.
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO REGIMES
Given the inefficiencies described above, a more specific standard
would lower transaction costs in the market.109  The obvious question
is how much more stringent the modified standard should be as com-
pared to the current one.  The CFTC has traditionally defined “com-
modity pool” broadly.110  A large part of the confusion in whether or
not someone is a CPO rests upon the difficulty in determining what a
commodity pool actually is.111  Thus, clarifying the scope of what con-
stitutes a commodity pool would reduce the confusion concerning
who must register as a CPO.  To do so, rather than examine commod-
ity pool regulation from only within the derivatives area, the CFTC
should look into the parallel regime of securities law, which provides
noteworthy insights.
A. History of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974
Before addressing potential substantive changes, an understand-
ing of the history of the statutory provisions governing commodity
pools and CPOs is necessary.  Analyzing the progression of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, which first regu-
lated CPOs,112 sheds light on the purpose of the regulations.
Congress enacted the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936 to regulate
futures trading.113  Originally, the CEA relied upon exchanges to pre-
serve market integrity.114  However, abusive trading was rampant, and
there was excessive speculation and manipulation of the markets to
the detriment of unsophisticated investors.115  Consequently, Con-
gress established the present regulatory structure by amending the
CEA and creating the CFTC as an independent regulatory agency
through the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.116
109 See supra Part II.B.  For a general discussion on the impact of transaction costs on
investor decisions using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as context, see Frank B. Cross &
Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333
(2006).
110 See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. R
111 See supra notes 67–91 and accompanying text. R
112 Rosen, supra note 34, at 939–40. R
113 JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS REGULA-
TION 28 (1987).  For a condensed timeline of the development of futures trading prior to
the CFTC, see History of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://
www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_precftc (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
114 See MARKHAM, supra note 113, at 62. R
115 Id. at 62–63.  Some abusive trading practices included “bucketing of customers’
orders, excessive trading between brokers, . . . and improper matching of customer or-
ders.” Id. at 62.
116 Ed Jones & John F. Cook II, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 5
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 457, 457 (1975); Rosen, supra note 34, at 939–40.  The CFTC is headed R
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Specifically, Congress granted the CFTC exclusive and pervasive
authority over the professionals who engaged in commodity trading
and interacted with the customers.117  Congress also brought into the
purview of the CFTC the regulation of CPOs, commodity trading advi-
sors, associated persons, and futures commission merchants.118  Prior
to the Congressional amendments to the CEA, these professionals had
remained largely unregulated with the exception that pools had to
post higher margins and CPOs had to keep records of the transac-
tions.119  Aside from general antifraud provisions in section 4 of the
CEA, the statute offered few private causes of action that an investor
could bring against the trading professionals.120  The CFTC imposed
registration requirements on these professionals, notably the CPOs in
1975.121  However, CFTC often granted exemptions on an informal
basis.122  The CFTC promulgated the first substantive regulations gov-
erning CPOs in 1979.123
The CFTC promulgated even more comprehensive regulations in
1981, and an examination of that process and the result is instruc-
tive.124  On August 4, 1980, the CFTC proposed substantial revisions
to the regulations passed in 1979.125  The revisions were proposed in
by four commissioners and a chairman. See MARKHAM, supra note 113, at 65.  To maintain R
independence, the commissioners were appointed by the president and had the authority
to hire investigators, experts, and clerks. Id. at 66.  For further discussion of the regulatory
scheme created by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, see generally Jones &
Cook, supra.
117 Rosen, supra note 34, at 939–40. R
118 Id. at 940, 953.  A futures commission merchant engages in the actual transaction
of accepting orders from investors to sell or buy commodity futures; it is analogous to a
brokerage house.  Jason E. Friedman, CFTC v. Gibraltar Monetary Corp. and Vicarious Lia-
bility Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 746 (2010).
119 Rosen, supra note 34, at 941. R
120 See id. at 941, 997–98 & n.437.  For more on the litigation permitted by the CEA
and its attendant difficulties, see generally William D. Harringon, Culpability and Its Content
Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 17 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
121 See Rosen, supra note 34, at 960–61; see also Carl E. Stetz, Note, The New Regulation of R
Foreign Based Futures Contracts and Commodity Options: Is International Regulatory Uniformity Far
in the Future?, 14 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 73, 84 (1988) (describing the registration process and
stating that the “federal courts have termed the registration requirements under the CEA
as the ‘kingpin’ of the regulatory framework” (quoting CFTC v. British Am. Commodity
Options Corp., 560 F.2d 135, 139–40 (2d Cir. 1977))).
122 Rosen, supra note 34, at 961; see also supra Part II.A (discussing the CFTC’s ad hoc R
approach to granting exemptions).
123 See Frank A. Camp, Note, The 1981 Revisions in the CFTC’s Commodity Pool Operator
Regulations, 7 J. CORP. L. 627, 634 & n.56, 635 (1982). An in-depth discussion of the 1979
regulations is beyond the scope of this Note.  See id. at 635–50 for such a discussion and
specifically a comparison of the 1979 regulations with the 1981 revisions.
124 Id. at 636.
125 See Revisions of Commodity Pool Operator and Commodity Trading Advisor Regu-
lations, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,004, 26,004 (May 8, 1981) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 4, 140).
The Commission ultimately received ninety-four comment letters during the commentary
period from CPOs, commodity trading advisors, futures commission merchants, investors,
the SEC, and numerous regulatory agencies, among others. Id.
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response to the rapid growth and popularity that commodity futures
trading experienced.126  Significantly, the Commission modified the
regulations to require that a CPO and the commodity pools it oper-
ates be separate legal entities.127  Ultimately, the Commission also
sought to narrow the definition of “pool” by clarifying in Regulation
4.10(d) that it includes only business entities “ ‘operated for the pur-
pose’ of trading commodity interests.”128  However, the Commission
explicitly rejected proposals to narrow the definition of the term
“pool” further.129  For example, the Commission declined a de minimis
exemption for business entities that traded commodities futures
under a certain percentage of their overall assets.130  The Commission
stated that they found this approach “deficient because it fails to take
into account the fact that such an entity might, nonetheless, be mar-
keted and sold as a commodity pool, so that the participants therein
should not be denied the protections” of the statute.131  The Commis-
sion also rejected narrowing the language to the “principal purpose of
acquiring or trading commodity interests.”132  The Commission stated
that this suggestion was unsatisfactory, as “it [did] not recognize that
an entity may commence operations in one line of business and subse-
quently may engage in another line of business—i.e., a commodity
pool.”133
The Commission, after considering the comments, decided to
adopt the revisions to Rule 4.10(d) as originally proposed.134  Moreo-
ver, it stated that the purpose of the revisions was to “make the infor-
mation CPOs and CTAs furnish customers more meaningful and to
effectuate the Commission’s intent that such information be
presented in a uniform format.”135  Furthermore, the Commission as-
serted that
126 Rosen, supra note 34, at 976. R
127 Revisions of Commodity Pool Operator and Commodity Trading Advisor Regula-
tions, 46 Fed. Reg. at 26,012.  In a practical sense, this meant that the funds had to be
received in the pool’s name, and the CPO was required to keep the funds of the property
separate with other personal assets. Id.  Moreover, Regulation 4.20(b) required that all
funds received by the pool must be made payable to the pool; the CPO may not receive the
funds on the pool’s behalf and reimburse the pool at a later date. Id. at 26,013.
128 Id. at 26,005.
129 Id. at 26,005–06.
130 Id. at 26,005.  The specific percentage suggested was ten percent. Id.
131 Id. (emphasis added).
132 Id. at 26,005–06 (emphasis added).
133 Id. at 26,006.
134 Id. at 26,005–06.
135 Id. at 26,004.  The Commission also adopted new regulations regarding the man-
ner in which CPOs had to prepare their disclosures, specifying the paper, size, and type of
acceptable reports. Id. at 26,005.  For more information on the revisions to administrative
provisions such as the pagination of documents, see id.
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[t]hese revisions also are intended to ensure that CPOs and CTAs
are dealing fairly with their customers and maintaining adequate
records of those dealings; to facilitate the Commission’s inspections
of the operations and activities of CPOs and CTAs; and to relieve
certain regulatory burdens and streamline and simplify reporting
and record-keeping requirements for CPOs and CTAs.136
However, the Commission did agree to expand the availability of
exemptions under section 4.13 for CPOs.137  Notably, the Commission
in section 4.13(a)(1) continued to exempt persons from registration
under certain circumstances if the person operated only one pool.138
The Commission also granted exemptions to persons operating a pool
in which the total gross capital contributions for all pools the CPO
operated were lower than $200,000 combined and each pool had
fewer than or equal to fifteen investors.139
B. Juxtaposing the Two Regimes
The history of commodity pool regulation is very telling of the
CFTC’s and Congress’s intent in placing commodity pools under gov-
ernment supervision.  This intent mirrors the SEC’s purpose in regu-
lating the commodity pool’s sister entity: the investment company.
Though of course the two types of funds operate in widely divergent
environments, their fundamental structures are very similar.  For ex-
ample, both solicit capital from outside investors, which a “manager”
or “sponsor” exchanges for financial instruments that further the en-
tity’s purpose.  On a deeper note, both share similar risks in mislead-
ing and harming investors.  That is, the operator of either the
investment company or the commodity pool can operate the fund in
such a way as to extract a benefit at the expense of investors, who
realize the scheme ex post.  So the question this all leads to is whether
the SEC’s well-developed regulatory regime for determining invest-
ment company status can be adopted and molded by the CFTC.
Investment companies are business entities that issue securities,
which are defined under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933
as “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap,
bond, debenture, . . . investment contract, . . . or, in general, any inter-
est or instrument commonly known as a ‘security.’”140  Section
3(a)(1) of the 1940 Act governs the definition of an “investment com-
136 Id. at 26,004.
137 Id. at 26,006.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012); see also Investment Companies, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfinvco.htm (last updated July 9, 2013) (“Gen-
erally, an ‘investment company’ is a company . . . that issues securities and is primarily
engaged in the business of investing in securities.”).
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pany.”141  A company can become subject to the 1940 Act by becom-
ing an investment company in one of three ways.142  An investment
company is any issuer that
(A) . . . holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trad-
ing in securities; (B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the busi-
ness of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type . . . ;
or (C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of invest-
ing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns
or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceed-
ing 40[%] of the value of such issuer’s total assets . . . .143
Business entities that fall within the realm of section 3(a)(1)(A) are
“engaged primarily” in the trading of securities.144  By contrast, com-
panies that become investment companies via section 3(a)(1)(C) do
not need to be “primarily” engaged but simply “engaged” in the trad-
ing of securities.145  However, section 3(b) of the Investment Com-
pany Act provides an exemption to the expansive 3(a)(1)(C)
provision.146  Section 3(b) states that “[n]otwithstanding paragraph
(1)(C) of subsection (a)[,] . . . [a]ny issuer primarily engaged, directly
or through a wholly-owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, in a business or
businesses other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding,
or trading in securities” is not an investment company.147  Therefore,
the SEC defines a company meeting the threshold level of activity “en-
gagement” needed to fall within the purview of the 1940 Act as “any
entity that (i) engages in the trading of securities, (ii) has a significant
investment in securities and (iii) is not primarily engaged in a business
other than that of trading in securities.”148  Section 3(b)(1) effectively
allows companies that are primarily engaged in a business that does
not involve trading securities to escape regulation as an investment
company, thereby implying that the threshold level of activity needed
to deem a company as “engaging” in securities trading is not met in
those instances.149  Hence, the definition of “primarily engaged” may
be instructive when making a determination of whether a business en-
tity’s level of securities trading is sufficient to constitute being “en-
gaged” and, consequently, whether the business entity is subject to
section 3(a)(1)(C).
141 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1).
142 See id.
143 Id.
144 Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A).
145 Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C).
146 See id. § 80a-3(b).
147 Id. § 80a-3(b)(1).
148 Brian Vito, Revisiting the Inadvertent Investment Company, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 125, 132 (2011) (emphasis added).
149 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(1).
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The SEC issued its first opinion interpreting the words “primarily
engaged” as stated in the 1940 Act in the matter of Tonopah Min-
ing.150  In making its decision, the SEC stated that the “principal rele-
vant considerations [were] 1) the company’s historical development;
2) its public representations of policy; 3) the activities of its officers
and directors; and, most important[ly], 4) the nature of its present
assets; and 5) the sources of its present income.”151  After Tonopah, the
SEC as well as the courts have continued to refer to these five factors
to provide guidance as to whether a company’s activities rise to the
level of one “primarily engaged” in trading securities.152  The SEC has
further refined the Tonopah analysis in interpretative letters, explain-
ing that the SEC “consider[ed] of first importance the area of busi-
ness in which the entity anticipates realization of the greatest gains
and exposure to the largest risks of loss.”153  Significantly, the SEC
cautioned that the gains and losses in futures trading would also be
compared to the company’s gains and losses in its other activities.154
The standard discussed above is applicable to reshaping the stan-
dard for determining whether a business entity is “operated for the
purpose of trading in commodity interests.”155  Recall that the pri-
mary issue with the current standard is that market participants will
find it too ambiguous and a costly obstacle, and that the standard may
sweep too broadly in determining commodity pool status.  In analyz-
ing whether the entity’s activities in commodities trading are sufficient
to rise to the level of “purpose,” the CFTC has expressly declined to
adopt a de minimis approach and rejected the modification of the pro-
vision to include “principal purpose.”156  This means that the CFTC
intended for the definition of commodity pools to encompass more
entities than those that primarily trade in commodities; however, a
strict and literal reading of the provision would include entities that
the CFTC did not intend to cover.  The CFTC could clarify the stan-
dard for the financial industry by adopting the SEC’s approach: per-
mit entities that could prove their primary purpose is to engage in a
business other than trading in commodity futures to circumvent the
definition of a commodity pool.  This general approach would allow a
company using commodities trading mainly to, for example, “hedge
its hog production and related feed costs”157 to escape the definition
150 Tonopah Mining Co., 26 S.E.C. 426, 426–27 (1947).
151 Id. at 427.
152 See Vito, supra note 148, at 146. R
153 Peavey Commodity Futures Funds, [1983–1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 77,511, at 78,652 (1983).
154 Id.
155 7 U.S.C. § 1a(10) (2012).
156 See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text. R
157 See CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 00-89, supra note 69, at *1; see also supra Part II.A R
and accompanying text (discussing CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 00-89).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN104.txt unknown Seq: 22  1-NOV-13 10:27
222 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:201
of a commodity pool.  In defining primary purpose, the CFTC could
look to the ways in which the SEC has defined “primary,”158 which
directly address the CFTC’s concerns regarding commodity pools.
For example, one of the factors that the SEC considers is how the
company markets itself, which was one of the concerns the CFTC ex-
pressed in declining the de minimis approach.159  The CFTC could ef-
fectively decide that failure to meet this prong means failure to prove
that a company is primarily engaged in a business other than com-
modities trading.160
If the CFTC decides to mirror the SEC’s analysis and provide an
exemption for businesses that can provide a showing of a “primary
purpose” in something other than commodities trading, the CFTC
could also further refine the meaning of “purpose” by adopting
nonexclusive safe harbors.  Again, the CFTC could look to the SEC as
an instructive example; the relationship between the statutory exemp-
tion of section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Regulation D is
relevant.161  Much like how Regulation D contains rules that clarify
the circumstances under which issuers qualify for a private placement
exemption under section 4(2),162 the CFTC could adopt nonexclusive
safe harbors that contain more concrete requirements that would ex-
empt funds from falling within the definition of commodity pools.
Like other safe harbors, Regulation D provides issuers with quantita-
tive thresholds and ceilings for de jure satisfaction of section 4(2).163
These thresholds and ceilings are meant to proxy the SEC’s goal of
permitting only sophisticated investors to have access to the private
offerings section 4(2) contemplates while relieving potential private
issuers of the ex ante headache of assessing nebulous and ambiguous
section 4(2) noncompliance risk.  In other words, the purpose of Reg-
ulation D was to lower transaction costs of private placement by elimi-
nating some of the ambiguities surrounding section 4(2).  The
158 See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. R
159 See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. R
160 See supra note 79. This issue speaks directly to the CFTC’s holding in the interpre- R
tative letter concerning commodity pools that had solicited funds from others in the past
(presumably marketing themselves as investment vehicles trading in commodities) but
were not presently engaged in the business of actively trading commodities. See supra notes
76–81 and accompanying text. R
161 See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2012) (exempting from regu-
lation “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering”); Definitions and Terms
Used in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2012); cf. Vito, supra note 148, at 167–70 (argu- R
ing that the SEC should utilize Regulation D to create an SEC exemption for commodity
pools so that the commodity pools do not fall within the purview of the Investment Com-
pany Act).  Taking Vito’s argument a step further, the CFTC could follow suit and use
Regulation D to help define what a commodity pool is.
162 Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 199, 261 (1992).
163 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501.
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CFTC’s goal in its commodity pool regulations (and, similarly, Con-
gress’s) mirrors the SEC’s purpose in creating Regulation D: to pro-
tect unsophisticated investors from unregulated investment structures,
such as commodity pools.  Thus, to provide specificity for the pro-
posed standard of “not primarily engaged,” the CFTC might delineate
notional value thresholds or aggregate profit and loss ceilings.  Should
the commodity pools in question be subsidiary operations of, for ex-
ample, an agricultural company, the subsidiary’s profit and loss on
derivatives and commodities trading can be used to proxy whether the
pool is acting speculatively and whether it is operating as a primary
profit center for the parent company.  If it is, then the pool can be
seen as a threat to investors that should be regulated.
CONCLUSION
The CFTC’s current regulatory structure for determining
whether someone is a CPO is to implement an ad hoc approach that is
contingent on the circumstances of each case and to grant exemp-
tions from registration requirements by issuing interpretation letters.
However, this method increases the likelihood that market in-
termediaries will be incapable of predicting whether the CFTC will
regard them as CPOs.  The uncertainty stems from the ambiguity of
the meaning “commodity pools”; the CFTC can decrease the level of
uncertainty that faces market intermediaries by adopting a more con-
crete standard for the definition, specifically for the phrase “for the
purpose of trading in commodity interests.”  The CFTC should ex-
empt the funds that can demonstrate a “primary purpose” in another
business activity from the definition of commodity pools, thereby cre-
ating an exemption for the potential CPOs.  To further clarify the ex-
emption and the meaning of “primary purpose,” the CFTC should
also adopt nonexclusive safe harbors.  The safe harbors would provide
more specific requirements that would exempt potential CPOs from
registration because the requirements would take the fund out of the
definition of a commodity pool.  Aside from providing market in-
termediaries with more certainty regarding their potential CPO status,
the CFTC would provide more clarity to the definition of a commodity
pool, an issue that has an independent significance in light of
Dodd-Frank and the Volcker Rule.  A more solidified standard would
provide a more comprehensive regime in which the scope of the new
regulations can be more easily ascertained, thereby promoting market
integrity and investor protection.
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